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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LAYTON CITY/

]>

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

I1

Docket No. 860493

i
]

Category No. 2

Plaintiff-Respondent/
-vsBILLY E. NOON,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion
to dismiss for lack of probable cause to make an arrest?

2.

Was defendant denied a fair trial due to ineffective
assistance of counsel?

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 30/ 1985/ defendant was arrested for
violation of §41-6-44/ Layton Municipal Code/ driving under
the influence of alcohol. (R. 2/8; Addendum 1). An
information was filed charging him with this offense,
(Addendum 2)

A one day jury trial was held on March 4/ 1986

in the Fourth Circuit Court of Davis County/ Layton
Department/ before the Honorable K. Roger Bean. (R. 3-5/
Tr. 1)

The following facts were revealed at trial.

The defendant drove his car into the parking lot of the
Circle K at the corner of Main and Antelope Drive/ Layton/ at
approximately 9 p.m.

(Tr.22,50/145)

A clerk at the Circle

K/ Matt Wilhelm, saw defendant drive into the parking lot

"pretty fast." (Tr. 22)
into the store. (Tr. 23)

Defendant parked his car and went
Mr. Wilhelm testified that

defendant was stumbling (Tr. 24)/ his speech was slurred and
he spilled coffee from a cup he had obtained in the store.
(Tr. 25)

Wilhelm also claimed he smelled alcohol on his

breath. (Tr. 25)

When defendant left the store to turn off

his car lights/ Wilhelm called the police. (Tr. 26)
Defendant reeentered the store and the police arrived
approximately five minutes after Wilhelm had called.
39)

(Tr.

Defendant was still in the store when the police

arrived. (Tr. 28)

There was no testimony as to what

defendant was doing during those five minutes.
Once Wilhelm pointed the defendant out to the police/
Officer Robnett/ Layton City Police/ walked over to the
defendant and asked him to blow into his hand. (Tr. 58)
After defendant had complied/ Robnett asked him to step
outside of the store and perform some field sobriety tests.
(Tr. 58)

Defendant performed the tests as requested by

Robnett and was subsequently placed under arrest "for his own
safety." (Tr. 63)
Robnett asked defendant to repeat the field sobriety
tests at the station. (Tr. 97-8/108)

Robnett also testified

that he requested the defendant perform a breathalyzer test
at the police station. (Tr. 66)

Defendant attempted to

comply/ but the results were never obtained.

(Tr. 152)

Officer Robnett was allowed to testify without objection
concerning defendant's supposed "refusal" to take the test.
(Tr. 67-70)

At the conclusion of the Statefs evidence/ defendant
moved to dismiss on two grounds: (1) no proof of corpus
delicti and (2) lack of probable cause to arrest for driving
under the influence of alcohol.
denied.

(Tr. 131)

The motions were

(TR. 131)

The jury found defendant guilty of driving while under
the influence of alcohol/ a class B misdemeanor/ in violation
of §41-6-44, Layton Municipal Code.

(R. 25/ Tr. 188) At

trial/ defendant was represented by attorney Christopher L.
Shaw. (Tr. 3)

After the jury verdict and prior to

sentencing/ defendant discharged Mr. Shaw and retained
present counsel to represent him in this matter. (R. 27-29)
On March 26/ 1986/ defendant was sentenced to jail for
180 days with 120 days suspended/ ordered to submit to
assessment by and undergo a treatment program with the Utah
Alcohol Foundation/ and ordered to pay fines and restitution
totaling $408.00.

(R. 30)

On April 23/ 1986/ the trial

judge denied defendant's motion for arrest of judgment and
order of acquittal or in the alternative for a new trial.
(R. 31-2/ 41-2)

Defendant appealed to the Second District

Court/ Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby presiding.

Memoranda of

points and authorities were filed by both parties.
52-61/ 63-74)

(R.

After oral argument held on July 22/ 1986/ the

District Court upheld the Circuit Court's verdict in a July
25/ 1986 ruling.

(R. 76-7)

Defendant subsequently took an

appeal to this Court. (R. 78-9)

-3-

Defendant's sentence has been stayed pending the outcome
of this appeal.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

The arresting officer did not have probable cause to

arrest defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol
since the officer never saw defendant drive/ there was no
verification of the informant's testimony placing defendant
in a vehicle and the informant did not testify concerning an
erratic driving pattern by defendant.

There was also a delay

in time between when the informant claimed he saw defendant
drive and when he was approached by the police.

In addition/

the arresting officer was so unsure about defendant's
condition that he asked defendant to perform additional field
sobriety tests after he had been placed under arrest and
taken to the police station.
2.

Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel

at trial since his attorney on several occasions during the
state's case failed to interpose objections to testimony that
should have been inadmissible under the Utah Rules of
Evidence.

The testimony was prejudicial to defendant and

denied him a fair trial.

-4-

ARGUMENT
I. PROBABLE CAUSE DID NOT EXIST TO ARREST DEFENDANT
FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL.
A warrantless arrest is permitted for violation of
§41-6-44, U.C.A. (1953/ as amended)/ as follows:
§41-6-44 (8). A peace officer may/ without
a warrant/ arrest a person for violation of this
section when the officer has probable cause to
believe the violation has occurred/ although not
in his presence/ and if the officer has probable
cause to believe that the violation was committed
by the person.
Addendum 1.
Probable cause is thus the standard by which the
constitutionality of the police officerfs actions in
questioning the defendant and subsequently arresting him is
to be weighed.

See Utah Constitution, Article 1/ Section 14;

United States Constitution/ Fourth Amendment.

Addendum 3.

The Utah Supreme Court has defined "reasonable" or "probable"
cause as follows:
The determination should be made on an objective
standard: whether from the facts known to the officer/
and the inferences which fairly might be drawn
therefrom/ a reasonable and prudent person in his
position would be justified in believing that the
suspect had committed the offense.
State v. Hatcher/ 27 Utah 2d 318/ 495 P.2d 1259/ 1260 (1972),
(fn. omitted).

"This level of probability must exist at the

actual moment of arrest/.../ and must be based on known
facts/...."

People v. Severson/ 561 P.2d 373/ 375 (Colo.

App. 1977) (citations omitted).

Based on the facts personally known to the officer/ he
did not have probable cause to arrest defendant for driving
under the influence.

"Probable cause may rest on reasonably

trustworthy information from an informant.

However/ some of

the details of the information given by the informant must be
verified before an arrest."

Pistro v. State/ 590 P.2d 884/

886 (Alaska/ 1979) (emphasis added) (fn. omitted).

See also

People v. Ramey/ 16 Cal.3d 263/ 127 Cal. Rptr. 629/ 545 P.2d
1333/ 1336 (1976).

Here/ there was no such verification as

to whether defendant had actually been driving an ciutomobile
sometime prior to Officer Robnett's encounter with him in the
Circle K.

Defendant made no admission of either drinking or

ownership of an automobile at any time/ whether prior to or
after his arrest. (Tr. 65-7)
The arresting police officer never saw the defendant
driving so had no opportunity to observe whether his driving
pattern was normal or not.

The only data available to the

officer at the time of the arrest which linked defendant to
the car was the statement of Matt Wilhelm. (Tr. 56)

There

was no testimony which led conclusively to the inference that
defendant was intoxicated while driving.
Defendant was in the Circle K for a period of time prior
to the arrival of the police.

There was no testimony as to

what activities defendant was involved in while in the store.
The Circle K and other convenience stores of its genre
provide beer for sale to the public.

The State's evidence

failed to exclude the possibility that defendant consumed
beer while on the premises sufficient to obtain the odor of

alcohol about his person and to render him intoxicated.
Indeed/ the arresting officer was so unsure that
defendant was actually intoxicated that he requested the
defendant to again perform field sobriety tests at the
station after defendant has been arrested. (Tr. 97-8/ 108)
Based on the above discussion/ defendant's arrest was
without probable cause and defendant's motion to dismiss on
this basis was improperly denied by the trial court.

II.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DENIED
DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL.

As the result of the ineffective assistance of his
counsel at trial/ defendant was denied the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and Article 1/ Section 12 of the
Utah Constitution. (Addendum 4)

The Utah Supreme Court has

recently held that in order to challenge a conviction on the
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel/

it is the defendant's burden to show: (1) that
his counsel rendered a deficient performance
in some demonstrable manner/ and (2) that the
outcome of the trial would probably have been
different but for counsel's error.
State v. Geary/ 707 P.2d 645/ 646 (Utah, 1985) (citations
omitted).
An accused in a criminal case has "the right to have
competent counsel who will take such actions and present
whatever defenses and interpose whatever objections he can in
honesty and good conscience justify in the interest of his

client."

State v. Gray/ 601 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah, 1979) (fn.

omitted).
Defense counsel committed several errors in his
representation of defendant.

First/ the prosecutor was

allowed to lead witness Wilhelm on direct examination
numerous times concerning facts central to the alleged
offense. (Tr. 24-8 43-6)

The testimony was damaging and the

manner in which it was elicited served to compound its
impact.
Second/ counsel failed to object to witness Wilhelm1s
lengthy/ extremely prejudicial and irrelevant explanation as
to why he called the police to report the defendant.

(Tr.

26) Such testimony should have been excluded under Rule 402/
Utah Rules of Evidence/ (irrelevant evidence inadmissible)
and Rule 403 (exclusion of prejudicial evidence).

(Addendum

5)
Third/ Officer Robnett was permitted to testify without
objection regarding his conversation with Mr. Wilhelm prior
to Robnettfs questioning of the defendant.

(Tr. 55-56)

The

statements made to Officer Robnett by Mr. Wilhelm were
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and were
inadmissible hearsay and should not have been admitted into
evidence.
5)

See Rule 802/ Utah Rules of Evidence.

(Addendum

The statements served to reinforce Mr. Wilhelm1s

testimony even though his credibility had not been challenged
by defendant.
Fourth/ Officer Robnett testified without objection
regarding defendant's attempts to take the breathalyzer test

and was permitted to read from his report form without
showing that this was necessary due to insufficient
recollection of the transaction.

(Tr. 67-70)

Again/ these

statements were hearsay inadmissible under any of the
exceptions to the hearsay rule and should have been excluded
under Rule 802/ Utah Rules of Evidence.

(Addendum 5)

Fifth/ without adequate foundation/ Officer Robnett was
permitted to testify to the legal conclusion that defendant
refused to submit to the breathalyzer test. (Tr. 70)

This

conclusion was inadmissible under Rules 701 and 702/ Utah
Rules of Evidence.

(Addendum 5)

The first part of the Geary test has been satisfied
since defendant has demonstrated above that trial counsel
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner.
As regards the second half of the test/ whether the outcome
of the trial would probably have been different/ it should be
pointed out that the evidence against defendant was weak and
the arrest was not supported by probable cause.

None of the

officers involved ever saw defendant's driving pattern/ nor
did they ever see him in the car.

Mr. Wilhelm did not

observe any erratic driving behavior either.

Since no blood

alcohol test was taken/ for whatever reason/ the jury had to
decide if defendant had in fact driven the car and at the
time of such driving was under the influence of alcohol based
solely on the witnesses1 testimony as to defendant's
behavior.

Given this reliance on subjective/ personal

observation rather than an objective test/ the outcome of the
trail could well have been different if counsel had not

committed the errors discussed above.

"[A] verdict or

conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely
to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming
record support."

Strickland v. Washington/ 466 U.S. 668/

696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Thus/ under the standards of Strickland/ Geary and Gray/
defendant has shown he was denied his right to counsel as
guaranteed by the United States and Utah Constitutions.

CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully asks the Court to find that the
errors complained of above require reversal of his conviction
and remand of this case for a new trial.

Respectfully submitted this 14th day of November/ 1986.

?. Franklin Allred
t^^o

A,

Margo L.UJames
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant

ADDENDUM

§41-6-44, U.C.A. 1953, as amended
§41-6-44, Layton Municipal Code
Information
Utah Constitution, Article I, §14
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
Utah Constitution, Article I, §12
United States Constitution, Amendments VI, XIV
Utah Rules of Evidence
Rules 401, 402, 403, 701, 702, 802

Addendum l
§41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended

41-6-44, Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug
or with high blood alcohol content — Criminal
punishment — Arrest without warrant — Suspension or revocation of license.
(1) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any
person with a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater by weight, or who is
under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of
alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of
safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state. The fact that a person charged with violating this section
is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug does not constitute a
defense against any charge of violating this section.
(2) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.
(3) (a) Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of
Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor; imprisonment shall
be for not fewer than 60 days. But if the person has inflicted a bodily
injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner, he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor; any
imprisonment in the county jail shall be for not more than one year.
(b) For the purposes of this section, the standard of negligence is
that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care
which an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under
like or similar circumstances.
(4) In addition to the penalties provided in subsection (3), the court shall,
upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48
consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with emphasis on serving in
the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a communityservice work program for not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours
and, in addition to the jail sentence or the work in the community-service
work program, order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction
under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43 (1), the court shall, in
addition to the penalties provided for in Subsection (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more
than 720 hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail,
or require the person to work in a community-service work program for
not less than 80 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition to the
jail sentence or the work in the community-service work program,
order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series
at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility. The court may, in its discretion, order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.

Note:

§41-6-44, Layton Municipal Code, is identical to

Addendum 1, continued
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five years after a second
conviction under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this
section adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43 (1), the court
shall, in addition to the penalties provided for in Subsection (3), impose
a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 2,160
hours with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require
the person to work in a community-service work project for not less
than 240 nor more than 720 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence
or work in the community-service work program, order the person to
obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under Subsection (3) may be
suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served.
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this
section or a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43 (1) may not be terminated and the department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a
result of the conviction, if it is a second or subsequent conviction within
five years, until the convicted person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs, assessed against the person, have been
paid.
(6) (a) The provisions in Subsections (4) and (5) that require a sentencing court to order a convicted person to participate in an assessment
and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility, obtain, in the discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or do any combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a violation of § 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under
Subsection (7), so as to require the court to render the same order
regarding education or treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility,
or both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction
under § 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (7),
as he would render in connection with applying respectively, the first,
second, or subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections 41-6-44
(4) and (5).
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under
§ 41-6-45 which qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (7), is
a first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous conviction under either § 41-6-44 or 41-6-45 is deemed a prior
conviction. Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any communitybased or other education program provided for in this section shall be
approved by the Department of Social Services.
(7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a
charge of a violation of § 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted pursuant
to Subsection 41-6-43 (b) in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an
original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state
for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not
there had been consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant in connection with the offense. The statement
shall be an offer of proof of the facts which shows whether or not there
was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant, in connection with the offense.

Addendum 1 ,

(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea
offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of
§ 41-6-45 as follows: If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty
or no contest to a charge of violating § 41-6-45, and the prosecutor
states for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or
a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense,
the resulting conviction is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection
(5).
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of
§ 41-6-45 which is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5).
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation
has occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable
cause to believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(9) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend for 90 days the operator's license of any person convicted for the first time under Subsection (1),
and shall revoke for one year the license of any person otherwise convicted
under this section, except that the department may subtract from any suspension period the number of days for which a license was previously suspended under § 41-2-19.6 if the previous suspension was based on the same
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based.
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a Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff,
Case No.

85TF881

vs.
Billy E. Noon
810 23rd Street #23
Ogden, Utah 84403
DOB: 6/20/56
Defendant.
The undersigned, William D. Robnett, under oath states on
information and belief that the defendant committed, in the
above-named county, the crime of DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS a Class B Misdemeanor, at the
vicinity of Antelope Drive, Circle K Lot, Layton, Utah, on or
about November 30, 1985 at about 9:15 p.m., in violation of
Section 41-6-44, Layton Municipal Code.
The acts of defendant constituting the crime were: That
at the time and place aforesaid the defendant did willfully and
unlawfully
operate and/or have actual physical control of a
vehicle within this state while under the influence
of alcohol and/or drugs to a degree which rendered
the defendant incapable of safely driving said
vehicle, and/or driving with a blood alcohol content
of .08% by weight or greater.
This information is based on evidence obtained from the
following witness: William D. Robnett.

fj/JLJb. 9M

Complainant

Subscribed and sworn to beforefmie this
January, 1986.
*
Circuit /udge

day of

Court

Addendum 3
Utah Constitution, Article I
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to he secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or thing to be seized.

United S t a t e s

Constitution
AMENDMENT IV

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or tilings to be seized.

Addendum 4

Utah Constitution, Article I
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

United

States

Constitution
AMENDMENT VI

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

Addendum 5
Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 401.

Definition of "Relevant Evidence.71

"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402.

Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant
Evidence Inadmissible.

All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the State of Utah, statute, or by these rules,
or by other rules applicable in courts of this State.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 403.

Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of
Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time.

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 701.

Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses.

If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony
in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those
opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on
the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony or the determination of a
fact in issue.
Rule 702.

Testimony by Experts.

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto' in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
Rule 802. Hearsay Rule.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by
these rules.

CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE

I hereby certify that four true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed/ postage
prepaid/ to the following on this

14th day of November/

1986.
Steven L. Garside
Layton City Prosecutor
437 North Wasatch Drive
Layton, Utah 84041

